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Abstract 
I examine the adequacy of the causal graph-structural equations approach to causation for 
modeling biological mechanisms. I focus in particular on mechanisms with complex 
dynamics such as the PER biological clock mechanism in Drosophila. I show that a 
quantitative model of this mechanism that uses coupled differential equations – the well-
known Goldbeter model – cannot be adequately represented in the standard 
(interventionist) causal graph framework, even though this framework does permit causal 
cycles. The reason is that the model contains dynamical information about the mechanism 
that concerns causal properties but that does not correspond to variables that could be 
subject to independent interventions. Thus, a representation of the mechanisms as a causal 
structural model necessarily suppresses causally relevant information.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have seen the advent of elaborate formal techniques for causal modeling 
(Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000; Pearl 2000). These techniques, which essentially 
link causality to manipulability, have been instrumental in taking philosophical debate 
about causation as well as about scientific explanation to a new level (e.g., Woodward 
2003, 2011; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003; Hitchcock and Woodward 2003; McKay 
Illari, Russo and Williamson 2011). Furthermore, this formal approach to causality has 
been productively applied in order to analyze causation in specific scientific disciplines. 
Originally developed mainly in the context of econometrics, it was recently also applied to 
various other sciences, e.g., neuroscience (Craver 2007, Weber 2008), genetics (Waters 
2007; Woodward 2010), evolutionary theory (Otsuka forthcoming), psychiatry (Woodward 
2008), or public health policy (Russo 2012), to name just a few.  
The basic tools of this approach are the formally definable concepts of directed 
acyclic graph (DAG), Bayesian network, and structural equation. In the standard approach, 
the causal interpretation of these formal concepts is provided by means of the concept of 
idealized intervention. The result are causal models that contain information about 
counterfactual dependencies between a set of variables as well as, in some cases, 
probability distributions defined over these variables. 
While the fruitfulness of this approach to causal modeling in scientific practice as 
well as for philosophical analysis is beyond doubt, there have not been many attempts to 
explore its limits in adequately representing causal systems. There has, of course, been 
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quite some debate concerning the question of whether a certain conception of mechanism 
is adequate for explaining biological phenomena (e.g., Bechtel 2005, 2013; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Braillard 2010; Kuhlmann 2011; Waskan, 2011; Weber 2012; Dupré 
2013; Woodward 2013). This debate focused on the issue of whether the standard 
conceptions of mechanism can account for biological processes that feature complex 
dynamical behavior and/or spatial structures. However, none of this work has directly 
challenged the underlying interventionist theory of causation itself. In fact, there is a whole 
range of more recent studies that attempt to show that Bayesian networks are actually 
adequate for modeling complex biological mechanisms (Casini et al. 2011; Clarke, 
Leuridan and Williamson 2014; Gebharter 2014; Gebharter and Kaiser 2014; Gebharter 
and Schurz, this symposium; Casini and Williamson, this symposium).  
In part, this problem turns on the question of how narrowly the term “mechanism” 
should be understood (Woodward 2013). In this paper, I will not be concerned with this 
issue. Rather, I want to examine to what extent the contemporary interventionist approach 
to causality is apt for representing the causal properties of a certain kind of mechanism in 
the first place. 
A critical issue will be the extent in which causal models that basically contain 
causal difference-making information can account for the dynamics and for spatial features 
of mechanisms, as such features are absolutely crucial for the explanatory force of many 
mechanisms, in biology and elsewhere. Woodward (2013) has argued that spatio-temporal 
information can always be integrated with the causal difference-making information 
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contained in causal models. While this may be true in some sense, I will show that it 
glosses over a basic problem pertaining to the dynamics of certain kinds of causal system. 
I will closely examine an example from biology that involves a mechanistic model 
consisting of a system of coupled differential equations with complex dynamics. This 
model describes the operation of a biological clock. I will assume without further argument 
that this model captures the essential causal properties of the biological clock mechanism, 
at least with respect to certain explanatory goals.1 Then, I will show that formal causal 
models fail to correctly represent these causal properties. Specifically, I will argue that 
such a model will not be able to treat time derivatives as causally relevant variables. 
I shall proceed as follows. In Section 2, I shall briefly review the core notions used 
in the causal modeling literature, in particular the notions of causal graph, structural 
equations, and ideal intervention. In Section 3, I analyze a dynamical model of a biological 
clock mechanism and show that it has no adequate causal graph representation. In Section 
4, I consider some attempts from the current causal modeling literature to represent 
differential equations in structural causal models. I show that the results coming from these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I am not assuming that there is just one correct way of representing a causal system. 
Thus, I accept the pluralist thesis according to which there is always a variety of different 
perspectives on the world none of which succeeds in providing a complete picture (Kellert, 
Longino and Waters 2006; Dupré 2013). In fact, I suggest that my arguments presented 
here could be used for actually defending such a strong form of scientific pluralism, but 
this would go beyond the scope of this paper.  
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attempts actually support my thesis. Section 5 summarizes and integrates my conclusions 
with regard to the limitations of causal modeling. 
 
2. Causal Modeling 
The formal concepts used in causal modeling include directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), 
structural equations and Bayesian Networks. In this paper, I shall focus on DAGs and 
structural equations and leave Bayesian networks aside, but it should be noted that any 
problem concerning DAGs will also affect causally interpreted structural equations as well 
as Bayesian networks because the latter two kinds of causal models contain DAGs.2  
A DAG is an ordered pair 〈V, E〉, where V is the set of variables and E is a set of 
directed edges. 
 
A DAG becomes a causal graph as soon as its edges are interpreted causally, about which I 
will say a little more below.  
Causal dependencies can also be represented by using so-called structural models 
(Pearl 2000). Such a model consists of an ordered triple 〈U, V, Q〉 where U is a set of 
exogenous variables, V a set of endogenous variables, and Q a set of structural equations. 
The structural equations give the value of each endogenous variable as a function of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I wish to thank Lorenzo Casini for pointing this out to me. 
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values of other variables in U and V. The variables may also be interpreted as nodes that 
are connected by causal arrows. But in contrast to pure causal graphs, the structural 
equations also provide quantitative information as to how much some dependent variables 
change per unit change of the independent variable.  
Pearl (2000, p. 160) gives the following “operational” definition of a structural 
equation: 
An equation y = βx + ε is said to be structural if it is to be interpreted as follows: In 
an ideal experiment where we control X to x and any other set Z of variables (not 
containing X or Y) to z, the value y of Y is given by βx + ε, where ε is not a 
function of the settings x and z. 
 
According to this definition, it is obvious that structural equations sensu Pearl are linear 
equations in the sense of not containing derivatives of the variables. As we shall see, this 
feature constitutes a major limitation when it comes to modeling systems with complex 
dynamics. 
 Pearl’s definition of a structural equation contains the idea of an “ideal 
experiment”. This notion has been elaborated in great detail by Woodward (2003, 94-99), 
who defines it in terms of the notion of ideal intervention. On this account, an (ideal) 
intervention on some variable X with respect to some variable Y changes Y by changing X 
without changing any other variable that is a cause of Y. 
In a nutshell, these are the basic concepts of causal modeling. Thus, when I speak 
about a “causal model” in what follows, I mean a model that is expressed by using either 
causal graphs or structural equations and that uses an interventionist criterion for 
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interpreting the graphs and equations causally. The goal of this paper (as well as the paper 
by Kaiser, this symposium) is to show that these concepts fail to fully account for certain 
causal explanations in biology.  
In the following section, I show what problems are created for causal models by 
complex dynamical information. Kaiser (this symposium) does the same for spatially 
complex mechanisms. Thus, while Kaiser’s paper is about space, this one is about time. 
 
3. It’s About Time: Modeling Dynamic Processes 
3.1. Classic Examples of Dynamic Models in Biology 
There is an important class of biological models that try to account for complex series of 
events in dynamical terms. A classic example is the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action 
potential (see, e.g., Weber 2005, 2008). This model (henceforth HH model) shows how 
changes in membrane conductance generate a temporary membrane depolarization that can 
spread along an axonal membrane and thus form the basis of information processing by 
neurons. A more recent example is Goldbeter’s (1995) model of the circadian oscillations 
of the PER protein in Drosophila, which is the heart of a biological clock mechanism. 
There are many more such models, but for the purposes of this paper we shall concentrate 
on these two.  
 
3.2. Bechtel and Abrahamsen on Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation 
In a recent series of papers, Bill Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen have provided a very 
illuminating account of models and mechanisms in circadian clock research, including 
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Goldbeter’s model and the PER mechanism (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010, Bechtel 
2013). Their account will prove to be useful for our analysis, which is why it will be 
briefly reviewed here. We take the gist of their account to be that circadian clock models 
provide what they call dynamic mechanistic explanations. According to Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, such explanations differ from other kinds of mechanistic explanations in 
providing quantitative information about the behavior of the systems in question. Dynamic 
mechanistic explanations (may) contain sequential mechanistic models that describe a 
series of events in purely qualitative terms. Figure 1 shows such a sequential mechanistic 
model.  
 
Figure 1. The sequential mechanism of the Drosophila circadian clock gene period. After 
Hardin et al. (1990). 
 
An interesting feature of this sequential model according to Bechtel and Abrahamsen is the 
fact that it is possible to mentally rehearse the individual steps as well as their temporal 
arrangement.  
Bechtel and Abrahamsen: Complex Biological Mechanisms p. 17 
could suppress per transcription since PER molecules lack the necessary region for binding to 
DNA.  
 
Figure 6. Hardin, Hall, and Rosbash’s (1990) mechanism for circadian oscillations in 
Drosophila. Expression of the gene per (transcription, transport and translation) produces 
the protein, PER, which is transported back into the nucleus. There PER inhibits further 
transcription of per. As this nuclear PER breaks down, per is released from inhibition and 
a new turn of the cycle begins.  
 
Given the complexity of the interactions, mathematical modeling is needed to determine whether 
such a mechanism is actually capable of generating oscillations. Already in the 1960s, just as 
oscillatory phenomena were being discovered in living systems, Brian Goodwin (1965) offered 
an initial proposal. Inspired by the operon gene control mechanism proposed by Jacob and 
Monod (1961), he developed a system of equations that characterized a generalized version of 
that mechanism (Figure 7). Here two kinds of proteins collaborate to inhibit gene expression: (1) 
an enzyme, and (2) the product of a reaction catalyzed by that enzyme, which as a repressor 
molecule directly inhibits gene expression. The critical parameter for determining whether 
oscillations occur is n (also known as the Hill coefficient), which specifies the minimum number 
of interacting molecules needed to inhibit expression of the gene. Carrying out simulations on an 
analogue computer, Goodwin concluded that oscillations would arise with n equal to two or 
three. But subsequent simulations by Griffith (1968) determined that oscillations occurred only 
with n > 9, a condition that was deemed biologically unrealistic. However, if nonlinearities were 
introduced elsewhere (e.g., in the subtracted terms representing the removal of the various 
substrates from the system), it was possible to obtain oscillations with more realistic values of n. 
Accordingly, Goldbetter (1995b) developed his own initial model of the Drosophila circadian 
oscillator by modifying the Goodwin oscillator. By capturing the operations in the circadian 
mechanism shown in Figure 6 in a system of differential equations adapted from those in Figure 
7, he achieved a 24-hour oscillation in concentrations of per mRNA and PER. Plotting these 
against each other over multiple cycles and conditions revealed a limit cycle (i.e., the two 
periodic oscillations with their particular phase offset acted as an attractor).  
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But the most important claim made by Bechtel and Abrahamsen for our purposes is 
the following: The qualitative sequential model as shown in Figure 1 is incomplete. For 
what the model must show is that the circadian system is capable of generating stable 
oscillations. This is where the dynamical, quantitative model constructed by (Goldbeter 
1995) comes in. The model describes the change in cytoplasmic concentrations of PER 
mRNA (M) as well as the different phosphorylation states of cytoplasmic (P0, P1, P2) as 
well as nuclear (PN) PER protein with the help of differential equations. The model uses 
standard Michaelis-Menten enzyme kinetics where the Vi are maximal reaction rates and 
the Ki the so-called Michaelis constants for the different biochemical reactions involved 
(the Michaelis constant gives the substrate concentration at which the reaction rate is half 
the maximal rate). 
The structure of the dynamical model can be extracted from Figure 5. 
 
Figure 2. The structure of Goldbeter's dynamical model (after Goldbeter 1995). The 
concentration of per mRNA is represented by M, that of different forms of the PER protein 
by Pi. P0 is the unphosphorylated, P1 the monophosphorylated and P2 the biphosphorylated 
form. PN is for the nuclear PER protein, all the other concentrations are cytosolic. vs is the 
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maximal rate of mRNA synthesis, vm and Km are the maximum rate and Michaelis constant 
for the enzymatic degradation reaction of the mRNA. The Vi and Ki give the maximum 
rates and Michaelis constants for the kinases and phosphatases catalyzing reversible 
phosphorylation reactions. vd and Kd are the enzymatic parameters for the degradation 
reaction of fully phosphorylated PER. k1 is a rate constant for the transport of PER protein 
into the cell nucleus, k2 for the reverse transport. Feedback inhibition of per mRNA by 
nuclear PER is modeled by a Hill equation with a cooperativity of n and a repression 
threshold constant KI.  
 
Goldbeter wrote down the reaction rates for the different molecular species as follows: 
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Using numerical integration techniques, Goldbeter was able to show that for some 
parameter values there is indeed a limit cycle, in other words, a stable oscillation of the 
concentrations of mRNA and PER protein.  
Bechtel and Abrahamsen stress that without this quantitative model, the sequential 
model provides no explanation for the stability of the circadian behavior. Without 
introducing quantitative parameters, the sequential model could produce all kinds of 
behavior, only some of which generate a limit cycle. Thus, the dynamical model must 
complement the sequential model to obtain the full explanation. 
I will argue now that at best the sequential model sensu Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
can be represented as a causal model. The dynamical model cannot be so represented, even 
though it clearly represents a causal process (in an idealized and simplified way). Thus, I 
shall argue that the Goldbeter model is a case of a biological explanation that cannot be 
accounted for by causal graph models. 
 
3.3 The Sequential Model as a Structural Causal Model 
I shall first attempt to represent what Bechtel and Abrahamsen call the sequential model 
within this causal framework. There is an apparent difficulty in that the sequential model is 
cyclical whereas causal graphs are acyclical. However, this problem is not new and 
solutions have been proposed by several authors (Kistler 2013; Gebharter and Kaiser 2014; 
Clarke, Leuridan and Williamson 2014). Briefly, one way of doing this is by introducing a 
time index on some of the nodes of the causal graph structures. When a system comes to 
the end of a cycle, time has passed. This new state of the system should thus be represented 
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by a different node, a variable that represents the state of the system at a later time. This 
way, the cyclical path is broken up and “rolled out” in time and presents no problems for 
the causal modeler. 
 However, it should be clear that such a causal graph fails to fully explain the 
explanandum phenomenon, because essential dynamical information is missing. The graph 
would merely represent what Bechtel and Abrahamsen refer to as the sequential model. In 
the next section, I shall examine how the dynamical model could be represented. 
 
3.4 The Dynamical Model as A Structural Causal Model 
Could the same strategy that works for the sequential model also be used for representing 
Goldbeter’s dynamical model by using causal graphs? It could be suggested that the causal 
structure of the model is captured by the following time-indexed causal graph: 
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Figure 3. Proposed time-indexed DAG representing the causal dependencies in the 
Goldbeter model. 
 
It could be argued, perhaps, that this DAG contains all the causal relations posited by the 
Goldbeter model. A quantitative structural model could also be constructed, for example 
by writing down rules for updating the values of the salient variables from each discrete 
time point to the next.  
 However, it should be clear that such a causal structural model would not be the 
same as the Goldbeter model. Differential equations with continuous time are 
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mathematically clearly different from a model with discrete time points.3 Perhaps there is a 
discrete-time model that makes approximately the same prediction as Goldbeter’s model. 
In fact, numerical simulations of the equation system use pretty much this strategy. 
However, the following difficulty arises: In order to really explain the explanandum 
phenomenon, a model must incorporate temporal information, namely information about 
how rates of change affect the behavior of the system. Goldbeter’s differential equations 
contain precisely such information, and this information is crucial for the model’s 
explanatory force. In fact, I wish to maintain that rates of change are causally relevant, 
because they are important determinants for the behavior of the whole causal process. 
Thus, I will show now that the Goldbeter model contains causally relevant variables that 
cannot be represented in the causal graph framework. Furthermore, to the extent that the 
model is substituted by a discrete-time model that is (approximately) predictively 
equivalent, the same difficulty arises. 
 My main argument is that Goldbeter equations do not have the right manipulability 
properties that are required by structural causal models. I will show, first, that not all causal 
variables can be subject to ideal interventions as required by the causal graph theory. 
Second, I want to show that the equations do not satisfy the modularity requirement that is 
widely thought to be important in causal models. 
First, to see the problem with ideal interventions, consider for example equation 
(1a) of the Goldbeter model. Suppose we wished to intervene on M, the mRNA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is known that difference equations can have quite surprising properties, see May 
(1974). 
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concentration. This obviously cannot be done in a way that leaves the time derivative 
dM/dt unchanged (if I want to go faster on my bike, thus changing the value of v, I have to 
accelerate and thus change the value of dv/dt). The same problem occurs for all the other 
causally relevant variables in the model. Note also that a discrete model faces the exact 
same difficulty; the only difference is that the rates of change are defined over a time 
interval instead of a time point. Thus, these equations cannot be subject to the idealized 
interventions that define causal relations according to causal modelers.   
Second, to see the failure of modularity, consider for example equations (1b) and 
(1c). Let us examine what happens when we replace (1b) by the following equation (1b*): 
dP0/dt = p0, where p0 is some real number. This would not only wipe out the r.h.s. of (1b), 
it would also affect the equations that determine the value of P0. The reason is, once again, 
that dP0/dt and P0 cannot be manipulated independently of each other. The same problem 
occurs for the other M- and P-variables. Therefore, the system of equations fails to satisfy 
the condition of modularity sensu Woodward (2003, 48-49, 327-39), which can also be 
viewed as a kind of manipulability.4  
What features of the Goldbeter model are responsible for this lack of 
manipulability, including modularity? It seems to us that the main such feature is the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The purpose of the modularity condition is normally to ensure that different equations 
represent different causal pathways or mechanisms. Perhaps it could be argued that, 
indeed, some causal mechanisms in the Goldbeter model overlap. For instance, there is a 
causal cycle between M and P0 as well as between P0 and P1 and these causal cycles share 
P0 as a common constituent (cf. Casini and Williamson unpublished). 
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that some causal variables that occur in the model affect their own rate of change, and that 
for these variables their rate of change is of crucial relevance – indeed causal relevance – 
for the behavior of the whole system. For example, the rate of change of mRNA (M) 
depends on its own concentration. This is due to a causal process that is mediated by 
RNA-degrading enzymes. Furthermore, the concentration of monophosphorylated protein 
P1 depends causally on the concentration of unphosphorylated protein P0, which in turn 
depends on P1. Both causal dependencies are mediated by kinases, thus they are causal 
processes.5  
In Goldbeter’s representation of these processes, not only the values of the 
variables at a given time point but also their rates of change are causally relevant. In other 
words, it matters not only that a variable X change its value from x1 to x2, which is the kind 
of information that can be encoded in causal graphs. It matters also how long it takes for a 
variable to change by some amount, including an infinitesimally small amount. This rate of 
change is a causally relevant property, but this causal relevance cannot be represented as a 
causal dependence in the causal framework because the rate of change cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 An anonymous referee suggested that these dependencies are not causal but constitutive 
or due to part-whole relations. While there might be some part-whole relations involved in 
the model (e.g., in the way in which different processes contribute to the overall rate of 
change of a variable), the dependencies we are talking about here, e.g., the dependence of 
the rate of change of M on the concentration M (equation 1a) are not of this kind. This 
dependence is due to an enzyme-directed biochemical reaction, which is clearly a causal 
processes. 
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manipulated independently of all the other variables and equation as the standard causal 
theory requires it (see above; lack of independent manipulability and modularity). Rather, 
in these causal processes, concentrations and their rates of change are so intimately 
intertwined and integrated (cf. Mitchell 2009) that it is not possible to disentangle causal 
difference-making and dynamical information.   
Why can the differential equations in the Goldbeter model not be replaced by 
something more akin to the causal modeler's structural equations, e.g., difference equations 
with a discrete time variable? As I have argued, it seems the same difficulty would arise: as 
soon as the concentration variables and the time intervals are fixed, the rates of change are 
determined and therefore no longer independent.6 Furthermore, replacing the differential 
equations by standard structural equations would be like trying to do Newtonian mechanics 
without using calculus; what would be the point? 
A possible response by the causal modeler might be to deny that the differential 
equations are even contenders for representing causal dependencies. Differential equations 
contain functions of time and their derivatives and need to be integrated in order to predict 
or explain physical events. Surely, when we want to discuss the causal content of models 
such as Goldbeter’s we have to consider suitably integrated forms of equations.  
The problem with this reply is that systems of differential equations such as 
Goldbeter’s or HH can only be integrated numerically. The solutions of these equations 
that are available, showing the concentrations of various molecular species, have been 
obtained with the help of computer simulations. In these solutions, whatever causal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee. 
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difference-making information was represented in the differential equations (if any) is 
irretrievably lost. However, these simulations provide a different kind of information: They 
show under which parameter values certain kinds of behavior are stable. In the case of the 
Goldbeter model, the behavior that is of particular importance, for obvious reasons, is 
stable oscillatory behavior. It can be represented by a limit cycle in a plane defined by 
mRNA and total PER protein concentrations. The limit cycle gives the initial conditions 
for M and Pt (= total PER protein concentration) that generate a stable oscillation, which 
functions as the basic Zeitgeber for Drosophila’s biological clock. I would not refer to this 
kind of information as causal difference-making information but as stability information.  
Perhaps it could be argued that the integrated model provides some kind of causal 
difference-making information as well. In his original 1995 paper, Goldbeter showed that 
the rate of PER protein degradation has a strong effect on the period of the oscillations. 
The more rapidly the protein is degraded in the cell, the longer the period of the 
oscillations become. The reason is intuitively clear: The more rapidly the protein 
disappears, the longer it takes for protein synthesis to rise the concentration above the 
threshold where the repression of transcription by nuclear PER protein significantly slows 
down gene expression such that the concentration of PER starts to drop after a period of 
increase. However, as intuitively obvious as this may be, the exact effect of the rate of 
decay on the period of the oscillations can only be predicted by such a dynamical model, 
which, as I have shown, contains causal information that is highly integrated with 
temporal, dynamical information and thus not representable by standard causal models, 
because the independent manipulability and modularity requirements are not satisfied.  
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In the following section, I will consider some results from the causal modeling 
literature as to how systems of differential equations can be represented by structural 
causal models. As I will show, these results, while it is highly illuminating for the problem 
at hand, actually support my thesis about the limitations of causal modeling. 
 
4. Differential Equations and Causal Structural Models 
Attempts to describe at least the equilibrium states of systems of differential equations with 
structural causal models can be found in the causation literature, for example, Mooij, 
Janzing and Schölkopf (2013); henceforth abbreviated as “MJS”.7 MJS treat systems of 
ordinary first-order differential equations such as they feature in many scientific models, 
e.g., the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics or the coupled harmonic 
oscillator in mechanics. The systems described by such equations may be considered to 
contain causal cycles. For instance, in a predator-prey system the density of predators 
affects the density of prey, which causally feeds back to the predator density. This is the 
kind of causal cycle that we also find in our biological clock case examined in the previous 
section. Even though causal graphs (DAGs) are typically acyclic, this is not a constraint 
that would somehow be necessitated by the formalism. I have already mentioned possible 
approaches to modeling causal cycles in Section. MJS take a somewhat different approach: 
They show that the equilibrium solutions of systems of coupled differential equations that 
describe systems with some causal feed-back correspond to a structural causal model.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I wish to thank an anonymous referee for calling this work to my attention. 
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 It is not possible here to reproduce the full treatment given by MJS. Basically, they 
consider dynamical systems represented by systems of coupled differential equations of the 
following form: 
 𝑋!(𝑡) = 𝑓! 𝑋!"𝒟 ! , 𝑋! 0 = (𝐗!)! ∀𝑖 ∈ ℐ 
 
where the indices 𝑝𝑎𝒟(i) range over the set of parents of the variable Xi, each fi is a smooth 
function of X, and each (X0)i is an initial condition. Then, they provide an account of what 
it means to intervene on such a system, as intervention is part of the standard semantics of 
causal models. In a nutshell, an idealized intervention can be described as: 
 
𝑋!(𝑡) = 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑓! 𝑋!"𝒟 ! , 𝑖 ∈ ℐ ∖ 𝐼 𝑋! 0 = 𝜉! , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑋!! , 𝑖 ∈ ℐ ∖ 𝐼 
 
In such an intervention, some set of components I of the system are forced to take some 
target value, such that the first time derivative of the variable Xi takes the value zero (i.e., X 
remains constant), while the variable takes some fixed target value ξi.8 Thus, whatever 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Note how this intervention must fix the values for both the variables and their rate of 
change at the same time (cf. Section 3.4). This is exactly how the structural causal model 
obliterates information that is explanatorily relevant. 
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mechanism previously determined the value of the Xi, the intervention exogenously breaks 
this mechanism and sets the variables to a fixed value. This corresponds to the well-known 
breaking of directed edges by intervention variables in ordinary causal graphs.  
 What is interesting to note in the present context is that, according to the definition 
of an idealized intervention given by MJS, such an intervention changes not just one but 
two equations. This shows, once again, that such a system of equations is not modular in 
the sense discussed in the previous section. (It might be modular in the sense that it doesn’t 
change any further equations, though).   
 The idealized interventions obviously change the equilibrium states of the system. 
For example, a Lotka-Volterra system has a steady state in which the predator and prey 
populations show an undamped oscillation. If intervened upon in the manner shown above, 
such a system changes its equilibrium state. If, for example, the intervention sets the 
predator density in a Lotka-Volterra system to ξ2, the system’s new unique stable 
equilibrium state is (Xeq1, Xeq2)=(0, ξ2). In general, equilibrium states of systems of 
intervened differential equations can always be obtained by setting the rates of change of 
the variables to zero by an intervention. The resulting equilibrium is then described by 
some equilibrium equations. 
 Just as in ordinary causal graph representations, nodes and directed edges can be 
used to represent the outcome of possible interventions on the variables figuring in systems 
of differential equations. In the cases such as the ones considered here, there will be a set 
of equilibrium equations for each possible intervention of the kind introduced above. MJS 
show how such equilibrium equations can be derived in general, and that they form causal 
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structural models in accordance with the causal framework assumed. Thus, it seems that 
the causal graph framework with its standard interventionist semantics is able to deal with 
systems of differential equations. MJS suggest that this approach “sheds more light on the 
concept of causality as expressed within the framework of Structural Causal Models, 
especially for cyclic models.” 
 I wish to draw a different conclusion from MJS’s highly illuminating treatment. In 
my view, their approach to dynamical systems described by differential equations reveals 
precisely the limitations to the causal graph framework that I wish to expose in this paper. 
For it is clear that such an approach can only deal with stable equilibrium states of a 
system, i.e., such equilibrium states where there is no more change. This is a simple 
consequence from the kind of interventions introduced, where the first derivatives with 
respect to time of the variables considered are set to zero. Thus, the structural causal 
models represent static situations rather than dynamic processes. For some intents and 
purposes, this may be fine. But if it is accepted that the dynamical models examined here 
are representations of the causal properties of a system and that the rates by which 
variables change is such a property, this kind of causal property does not seem to be 
captured by ordinary causal structural models. 
 I wish to end this argument by disenabling a potential misinterpretation. My thesis 
of this paper should not be understood as a claim about causal discovery. None of the 
considerations presented here support the conclusion that a causal search procedure of the 
kind developed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000) would be unable to identify all 
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the variables that values of which affect the behavior of the system.9 I am only claiming 
that the entities referred to by these variables have causal properties – in particular the rate 
of change – that cannot be given a causal interpretation by using the standard formalisms. 
  
6. Conclusions 
My intention in this paper has not been to argue that there exist forms of explanations in 
biology that are not causal. There clearly is a sense in which DNA sequence recognition by 
proteins (Kaiser, this symposium) as well as the biological clock mechanisms discussed 
here are causal processes. What I as well as Kaiser (this symposium) want to show is that 
these biological explanations contain causal information that is not reducible to causal 
difference-making information of the kind that can be expressed in the formal causal 
models available today. Biological explanations often contain causal information that is 
inextricably intertwined with, first, spatial information and, second, dynamical 
information. The spatio-temporal aspects represented in these explanations are not such 
that they could simply be integrated with the causal difference-making information to give 
the full picture. At least in the case of the dynamical information contained in systems of 
differential equations, there appears to be a deep incompatibility between the axioms of 
causation and the dynamical model. Just as the circadian clock mechanism cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For an illuminating discussion of this important issue in the context of systems of 
differential equations see Dash (2005). It should be noted that, just like in the Mooij, 
Janzing and Schölkopf (2013), time derivatives of variables are never treated as 
independent causes. 
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understood by looking at the level of individual molecules, complex spatially organized 
cohesive interactions in DNA-protein complexes (see Kaiser, this symposium) cannot in 
practice be expressed by causal graphs in a way that brings out the explanatory power and 
utility of these models.  
 My conclusion with respect to dynamical mechanistic models differs thus 
somewhat from Bechtel’s and Abrahamsen’s illuminating analysis: What they call the 
sequential and dynamical mechanisms, respectively, represent not two models that 
complement each other. Rather, in my view they represent incompatible perspectives on 
the same phenomenon of the kind that scientific pluralists have postulated (Kellert, 
Longino and Waters 2006). 
Thus, rather than just the need of supplementing causal graphs with spatio-temporal 
labels such as to fine-tune them, a close examination of biological explanations rather 
reveals some intrinsic limitations of a certain type of causal model. Perhaps a new theory 
of causation is needed in order to do (more) justice to such explanations, in biology as well 
as in other sciences that deal with complex dynamical processes. 
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